

Picking Up the Best Goal

An Analytical Study in Defeasible Logic

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BDI is a popular architecture to model autonomous agents:

- B Beliefs: How the agents perceives the environment
- D Desires: What the agent wants to achieve
- I Intentions: What the agent commits to

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Beliefs, Intensions and Desires are called **mental attitudes**;
Intentions and Desires are also **motivational attitudes**.

- Is there anything missing in the BDI architecture?

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- Is there something redundant in the BDI architecture?

Why BIOlogical agents? self-evident

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Why BIO Logical agents?

- B** Beliefs: the description of the environment
- I** Intentions: the **internal** constraints/motivational attitudes
- O** Obligations: the **external** constraints/motivational attitudes

I wish U were here



Desires, Goals, Intentions, Social Intentions are nuances of a more general concept: oUtcomes (the objectives of an agent)

- An agent is modelled by a set of rules;
- When an agent faces alternative outcomes in a given context, it is natural to rank them in a preference order;
- Beliefs prevail over conflicting motivational attitudes, thus avoiding various cases of wishful thinking;
- Norms and obligations are used to filter social motivational states (**social intentions**) and compliant agents;
- Goal-like attitudes can be derived via **conversion** using other mental states, such as beliefs (e.g., believing that Madrid is in Spain may imply that the goal to go to Madrid implies the goal to go to Spain).

- Belief rules

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow C$$

- Obligation rules

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_O C$$

- Outcome rules

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_U C$$

- Belief rules

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- Outcome rules

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_U C$$

$$C = c_1 \odot c_2 \odot \dots \odot c_n$$

Example



holiday \Rightarrow_U *visit_friend* \odot *visit_parents* \odot *stay_home*

Desires as acceptable outcomes



$$r : a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_U b_1 \odot \dots \odot b_m$$

$$s : a'_1, \dots, a'_n \Rightarrow_U b'_1 \odot \dots \odot b'_k$$

where a_1, \dots, a_n and a'_1, \dots, a'_n are mutually compatible
 b_1 and b'_1 are mutually incompatible ($b'_1 = \neg b_1$).

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$b_1, \dots, b_m, b'_1, \dots, b'_k$ are all desires (acceptable outcomes)

If $s > r$, then $b_2, \dots, b_m, b'_1, \dots, b'_k$ are desires (acceptable outcomes)

Goals as preferred outcomes



$$r : a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_U b_1 \odot \dots \odot b_m$$

$$s : a'_1, \dots, a'_n \Rightarrow_U b'_1 \odot \dots \odot b'_k$$

where a_1, \dots, a_n and a'_1, \dots, a'_n are mutually compatible
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b_2 and $\neg b_1$ are the goals (most preferred outcomes)

Intentions as feasible outcomes



$$r : a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_{\cup} b_1 \odot \dots \odot b_m$$

and the agent knows $\neg b_1$

Intentions as feasible outcomes



$$r : a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_{\cup} b_1 \odot \dots \odot b_m$$

and the agent knows $\neg b_1$

b_2 is the intention (the preferred feasible outcome)

Intentions as feasible outcomes (2)



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and the agent knows b_1

Intentions as feasible outcomes (2)



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$s > r$

and the agent knows b_1

b_1 and b'_2 are the intentions (the preferred feasible outcomes)

$$r : a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_U b_1 \odot \dots \odot b_m$$

$$s : a'_1, \dots, a'_n \Rightarrow_O b'_1 \odot \dots \odot b'_k$$

where a_1, \dots, a_n and a'_1, \dots, a'_n are mutually compatible
 b_1 and b'_1 are mutually incompatible ($b'_1 = \neg b_1$).

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$\neg b_1$ is obligatory and b_2 is socially intended (most preferred feasible outcome that does not violate the obligations)

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$\neg b_1$ is obligatory and b_2 is socially intended (most preferred feasible outcome that does not violate the obligations)

If the agent knows $\neg b_2$, then b_3 is socially intended

To prove that an agent believes p .

There is a belief rule

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_B p$$

- all a_i are provable
- and all rules for $\neg p$ are either not applicable or weaker than an applicable rule for p

To prove that p is obligatory

There is an obligation rule

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_O c_1 \odot \dots \odot c_m$$

- $p = c_j, 1 \leq j \leq m$
- all a_i are provable
- for all $c_i, i < j$:
 - c_i is obligatory and
 - the agent does not believe c_i
- defeasibility

To prove that an agent desires p

There is an outcome rule

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_{\cup} c_1 \odot \dots \odot c_m$$

- $p = c_j, 1 \leq j \leq m$
- all a_i are provable
- defeasibility

To prove that p is a goal of the agent

There is an outcome rule

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_{\cup} c_1 \odot \dots \odot c_m$$

- $p = c_j, 1 \leq j \leq m$
- all a_i are provable
- for all $c_i, i < j, c_i$ is not a goal of the agent
- defeasibility

To prove that the agent intends p

There is an outcome rule

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_{\cup} c_1 \odot \dots \odot c_m$$

- $p = c_j, 1 \leq j \leq m$
- all a_i are provable
- for all $c_i, i < j$,
 - c_i is not an intention of the agent
 - the agent does not believe $\neg c_i$
- defeasibility

To prove that the agent intends p

There is an outcome rule

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \Rightarrow_{\cup} c_1 \odot \dots \odot c_m$$

- $p = c_j, 1 \leq j \leq m$
- all a_i are provable
- for all $c_i, i < j$,
 - c_i is not an intention of the agent
 - c_i is not forbidden (i.e., $\neg c_i$ is not obligatory)
 - the agent does not believe $\neg c_i$
- defeasibility

Theorem

The logic is coherent, i.e., it is not possible to prove Xp and $\neg Xp$ (and Xp and $X\neg p$) for $X \in \{G, I, SI, O\}$

Theorem

The extension of the logic can be computed in $O(|D|)$, where D is the number of symbols occurring in a theory.

- A novel account of the notions of goals like attitudes for agents
- We have argued that the notions of desires, goals, intentions are facets of a more general concept (i.e., outcome/objective)
- The account can be formalised in Defeasible Logic in a computationally feasible way

Questions?